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The first response time (henceforth FRT) of economics journals has increased over the last four 
decades from 1-2 months to 3-6 months. The optimal FRT, however, is not zero, because the 
FRT deters submission of mediocre papers to good journals and consequently saves valuable 
time of referees and editors. The change in the actual FRT is in the same direction as the change 
in the optimal FRT, which has increased because of the availability of research on the Internet 
prior to publication and because the costs of refereeing a paper have increased.  
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1. Introduction 
Academic publishing has been the subject of several studies recently. Some studies considered 
the pricing of academic journals (e.g. McCabe, 2002 and Bergstrom, 2001), while others focused 
on various aspects of the review process: the use of single-blind versus double-blind review 
(Blank, 1991), payment to referees (Engers and Gans, 1998; Chang and Lai, 2001), and the 
value-added from the review process (Laband, 1990) are a few examples. Indeed, research on the 
academic review process is not only interesting for most academics, but is also very important 
because of the insights it might suggest about how the review process can be improved, 
enhancing the productivity of economists and scholars in other disciplines. 
 Two of the main criticisms about the review process are the long time that it takes 
overall, and the long time it takes to get a first response on a submitted manuscript (first response 
time, henceforth FRT). The overall review time is often measured by the submit-accept time, the 
time from first submission of the article to the journal that eventually publishes it until its 
acceptance. The overall review time has received some attention recently: Ellison (2002a) 
documents a slowdown in submit-accept times in economics over the last three decades, and 
Ellison (2002b) suggests that several additional disciplines also experienced a similar slowdown. 
The major cause of this slowdown is that authors are required to revise their papers more times 
and more extensively than in the past. Earlier studies of the publication delay include Yohe 
(1980) and Trivedi (1993).  
 As opposed to the submit-accept time, however, the FRT has not received any systematic 
analysis recently. The FRT is particularly important because it often delays the publication of an 
article more than once (as opposed to other parts of the submit-accept time) when the paper is 
rejected from one or more journals prior to being accepted in a different journal. Azar (2004a), 
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for example, estimates that papers are submitted on average 3-6 times prior to publication. In 
what follows I discuss the FRT in economics and in particular I address three questions: what is 
the FRT in economics today, how has it changed over the last few decades, and can the change 
be beneficial? 
2. The Slowdown in First Response Times of Economics Journals 
2.1 First Response Times Today 
 While many economics journals publish with each article its acceptance date or the dates 
in which the initial and final versions were received, no economics journal I encountered 
publishes information about the FRT of each article published. Going over dozens of journals, 
however, I found several journals that publish aggregate FRT statistics; Ellison (2002a) and 
websites of various journals provided me some more data. Table I presents the FRT in various 
journals. The table includes also FRT in journals in accounting and finance; the difference in the 
FRT between these fields and economics is puzzling and explaining why it exists is an intriguing 
topic for future research.  
 A few interesting outliers in the table are the journals of the Berkeley Electronic Press. 
Those are electronic journals that were established in recent years with the purpose “to address 
the inefficiencies that characterize the current scholarly publishing model.”2 If we look at the 
more established print journals in the table, however, we can see that the FRT in economics 
journals is generally between three and six months. From the author’s perspective the FRT is a 
                                                 
2 Quoted from the mission statement of the Berkeley Electronic Press, available on-line at 
http://www.bepress.com/aboutbepress.html. 
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little longer (for snail mail submissions) because the FRT reported by the journal does not 
include the mailing time from the author to the journal and back.  
  Additional evidence for the FRT in economics is provided by Seidl, Schmidt and Grosche 
(2002), who sent economists questionnaires about their experience with the refereeing process in 
economics journals. They report the responses to the question “After submission of your paper, 
how long did it take on average to get a reply other than just a confirmation that your paper had 
been received?” In 110 journals for which they had at least five answers, the median journal’s 
FRT is 20.2 weeks, the 10th percentile is 12.6 weeks, and the 90th percentile is 29 weeks. This 
FRT is based on the authors’ perspective, so it already includes the mailing time in both 
directions.  
2.2 First Response Times Circa 1960 
 Forty years ago journals did not publish FRT data on a regular basis, but nevertheless 
there is some evidence for the FRT at that time. Marshall (1959), for example, sent 
questionnaires to editors of 30 economics journals, and received usable answers from 26 
journals. Out of these 26 journals, Marshall reports that “Twenty-three editors reported that they 
gave notification one way or the other within 1 to 2 months, and only 2 editors reported a time-
lag of as much as 4 months or more.” Coe and Weinstock (1967) report the results of a survey in 
which the mean review time is 76 days for domestic journals (US + Canadian) and 70 days for 
foreign journals.3 It seems that the review time they report refers to the time from submission to 
acceptance, which is longer than the FRT (although in the 1960’s the difference between the 
                                                 
3 Coe and Weinstock report 75 and 73 days in Table 3, but direct computation based on the detailed data they 
provide in Table 1 suggests that the correct numbers are 76 and 70 days for domestic and foreign journals.  
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FRT and the submit-accept time was much smaller than it is today because revise-and-resubmit 
was not common in that period, see Ellison, 2002a).  
 While editors’ reports did not include turnaround statistics on a regular basis, 
occasionally these reports include some indication for the FRT in that period. In the first issue of 
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (which changed its name to Bell 
Journal of Economics in 1974 and to RAND Journal of Economics in 1984), the editor states 
“The Editorial Board undertakes to furnish the author of a submitted article with a decision on 
publication within a month of receiving the manuscript” (MacAvoy, 1970).  
 The editors of The Economic Journal describe the review process in the journal in the 
early 1970s (Champernowne, Deane and Reddaway, 1973):  
The article is then considered by one of the two editors dealing with articles, who 
normally sends it to a referee with a stock letter which expresses the hope that he will 
report within three weeks if at all possible. We have a good system for “chasing” referees 
with reminders, but in the main they give us remarkably good service. As a check on this 
general impression, we analyzed our records for the period from 1 January 1971 to 13 
June 1972, and reported the following result to the 1972 meeting of the Editorial Board: 
 Time to Receive Report  Number of Reports 
 Under 3 weeks    158 
 3 weeks – 2 months    101 
 Over 2 months    27 
    286 
The people in the third category were dropped from our list of referees, unless there was 
a good reason for the delay. 
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 The editor of Econometrica, in his report dated June 30, 1975, states “The time between 
submission and editorial decision continues to remain roughly stable with the median time for 
papers in process about two months” (Fisher, 1976). Finally, Table II presents data about the 
FRT in the QJE in the years 1940 − 1980 for accepted and rejected manuscripts.4 The FRT for 
all manuscripts is obviously closer to the number for rejected papers than that for accepted 
papers due to the small acceptance rate in the QJE. In 1960, the FRT was around two months.  
3. Can the Slowdown in the FRT be Beneficial? 
 The discussion above suggests that the FRT grew from about 1-2 months circa 1960 to 
about 3-6 months today. At first the change seems as a bad outcome. Slower FRT means that 
new research is disseminated to the academic community less promptly, which is a bad thing. 
Nevertheless, I argue that this slowdown is in fact in the same direction as the change in the 
optimal FRT. To understand why, I explain below first why the optimal FRT is not zero, and 
then why the optimal FRT has increased over the last forty years. 
3.1 Why is the Optimal FRT Positive? 
 What is the optimal FRT? At first, it seems that as long as we do not reduce the quality of 
the review process, we would like the delay it causes to be minimal. This will allow research to 
be disseminated as fast as possible, which is particularly important since new research often uses 
previous results. We would like the referee to read the paper and write a report about it the same 
                                                 
4 I thank Glenn Ellison for the raw data used to compute the numbers in the table and for helpful advice. The 
procedure he used to collect the sample ensures that this is a random sample with respect to the FRT.  
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day he receives the paper, not four months later. Nevertheless, I claim that the optimal FRT is 
not zero.  
 What good does a longer FRT yield if the quality of the review process is unchanged? 
The answer is that it reduces the costs of the refereeing process, because a longer FRT reduces 
the number of submissions of low-quality papers to good journals. With zero FRT, and given the 
low submission fees in economics, the cost for an author of submitting an existing paper to a top 
journal is so small compared to the potential benefits (if the paper is eventually accepted there) 
that it is worthwhile to do so even when acceptance chances are very low. By submitting the 
paper, however, the author creates a social cost: referees and editors have to dedicate their scarce 
time to evaluate the paper. The problem is that the author faces a private submission cost that is 
much lower than the social cost of submission. For example, the author may pay $50 as a 
submission fee, but this is much lower than the value of several hours of work of two referees.5 
 Increasing the FRT can alleviate this problem, since higher FRT increases the submission 
cost for the author. The FRT delays the publication of the paper, and thus creates a cost for 
untenured authors who want to have publications before their tenure decision. The FRT also 
                                                 
5 Another way to cause the author to internalize the social costs of the refereeing process is to increase the 
submission fee significantly (say to a few hundred dollars). This will create other problems, however, such as 
discrimination between authors with different financial abilities. Moreover, for some authors the submission fees are 
paid by their institution, by a grant, or from a non-binding research budget; in those cases an increase in submission 
fees might be ineffective. Interestingly, submission fees in finance and accounting (where the FRT is much shorter 
than in economics) are higher than in economics. Another interesting point is that the Berkeley Electronic Press 
journals (that have the shortest FRT in economics) require that the author will referee two papers for each submitted 
manuscript (in addition to a submission fee), thus causing the author to internalize the social cost of refereeing that 
his submission creates.  
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creates a cost for tenured authors, because promotion and salary depend on publications.6 The 
delay created by the FRT causes the author to think twice before submitting his paper to journals 
where he has very low acceptance chances, and thus decreases the number of submissions of 
low-quality papers to good journals and reduces the costs of the refereeing system by saving the 
scarce resources of editors and referees.  
 For concreteness, consider the case of a mediocre paper and the top journals. The QJE 
and REStud do not charge submission fees at all, Econometrica does not charge submission fees 
from society members, JPE charges $75 for subscribers and AER charges $100 for members of 
the American Economic Association. Since every paper has some merits, and referees 
occasionally make mistakes, even mediocre papers have positive acceptance chances even in the 
top journals.7 Even if the paper in fact has zero chances to be accepted, the author may 
overestimate its chances (on biases of authors regarding the quality of their papers see also 
Ellison, 2002b). Given the enormous benefits of a publication in a top journal (better chances to 
get tenure, higher lifetime earnings, prestige, better chances that the research will be read etc.), 
with a zero FRT, the optimal submission strategy (even of mediocre papers) is to submit to each 
of the top journals (sequentially). Hundreds of mediocre papers that today are not submitted to 
top journals will be submitted, increasing significantly the costs of the refereeing process. The 
                                                 
6 Moore, Newman and Turnbull (2001), for example, found in a sample of US economics professors that a 
publication in the top 10 journals in economics increases salary by 2.9 percent on average, and a publication in 
journals ranked 11 – 55 increases salary by 1.7 percent. On the returns to publications see also Sauer (1988) and 
Price and Razzolini (2002). 
7 Laband, Tollison and Karahan (2002), for example, show that even in the AER and the JPE some papers do not 
receive any citations in the five years following their publication, suggesting that these papers are not important and 
that their acceptance was a mistake.  
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same idea applies when we compare two positive values of FRT: higher FRT increases the 
submission cost (for the author) and therefore reduces the number of redundant submissions 
(those where even the author knows his acceptance chances are very low). It follows that the cost 
of the review process (which is mainly the time cost of referees and editors) is a decreasing 
function of the FRT. The trade-off between lower cost of the review process and slower 
dissemination of research determines the optimal FRT.8  
3.2 Why has the Optimal FRT Increased over the Years? 
 Two major changes in the environment caused the optimal FRT to increase over the last 
few decades. One change is that articles today are longer and more mathematical than in the past 
(see Ellison, 2002a; 2002b). Even though referees also became more familiar with mathematical 
techniques than in the past, it still takes more hours to read, understand, evaluate and write a 
referee report on a mathematical paper than on a qualitative paper. In addition, it takes more 
hours to referee papers today than in the past because the papers are longer. Consequently, the 
social costs of reviewing a submitted manuscript increased, and it became more important to 
deter submissions of mediocre papers to good journals. This increases the optimal FRT. 
 The second change is the increasing availability of working papers. Today working 
papers are far more available than they were forty years ago, because individuals and institutions 
post their working papers on the Internet. Consequently, people often know about research in 
their field before it is published in a journal. Forty years ago it was much harder to know about a 
                                                 
8 It is important to stress that the advantage of a longer FRT applies only to new manuscripts, and not to revised-
and-resubmitted ones. The benefit of preventing excessive submissions is irrelevant for papers that were good 
enough that a revised version was requested, while the cost of delaying the dissemination of research still exists. 
Therefore, the delay of resubmissions should be as short as possible (given a constant review quality). 
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new article before its journal publication. As a result, the importance of quick publication of 
research in journals (from the society’s perspective, not the author’s) has been reduced. In the 
trade-off that determines the optimal FRT the cost of a longer FRT (slow publication) has been 
reduced, increasing the optimal FRT.  
 A possible objection to this conclusion is that the availability of working papers prior to 
publication is irrelevant, because people do not read working papers. There are so many working 
papers, the argument goes, that people cannot afford to spend time reading them all just to find 
some of high quality. They prefer to wait until the high-quality papers are accepted in good 
journals, and then read only them. 
 There are several reasons why this may not be true and people do read working papers. 
First, the quality of working papers is not completely unknown. The authors are known and often 
the identity of the author can give a good idea about the quality of the paper. Many papers are 
presented in seminars, so potential readers have an idea about the quality of these working 
papers. Researchers also talk about papers they read, so once one person obtains information 
about the quality of a working paper (from seeing it presented in a seminar, reading it, and so 
on), others may receive this information from him. Often a short overview of a paper suggests 
whether it is of high quality or not, especially to readers who are familiar with the topic (and 
usually potential readers are familiar with the topic), so it is possible to review quickly many 
working papers and read thoroughly just the high-quality ones.  
 Moreover, while the number of working papers in general is high, if one is interested in a 
particular topic, the number of working papers available need not be so high as to exclude the 
possibility to read them all. Thus, when one is researching a certain topic, he can often afford to 
read the working papers that are closely related even before they are published. Electronic 
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databases (e.g. Econlit, IDEAS, and SSRN) make the task of finding relevant working papers 
relatively easy. 
 To support the claim that working papers are being read and are more important today 
than in the past, I examined empirically whether working papers are being cited in published 
articles. I categorized each citation in the May 2002 issue of Econometrica and the March 2002 
issue of the AER (1109 citations in total) as a working paper, journal article, book, chapter in an 
edited volume, forthcoming article, or other (including sources such as governmental published 
statistics, Ph.D. dissertations, and newspapers). For comparison, I did the same analysis for the 
first two 1960 issues of Econometrica (January and April) and AER (March and June), with 420 
citations in total.  
 Table III presents the distribution of citations. First, it is easy to see that the importance 
of working papers increased significantly over the years. Working papers accounted for less than 
3% of citations in 1960, but account for about 14% of citations today. Second, we can see that 
working papers are being read and therefore their increased availability today is important. A 
cited working paper indicates that the author who cited it was familiar with its contents. If no one 
reads working papers prior to publication, we should expect to see no citations of working 
papers. The results show that while journals account for the majority of citations today – more 
than a half of total citations – the importance of working papers is without doubt. Working 
papers are the second largest source of citations in both Econometrica and the AER. The high 
frequency of working-paper citations is especially astounding given that most working papers 
cited are from the last few years while citations of journals and books can date decades ago. 
Moreover, citations of working papers underestimate the importance of working papers, because 
authors update references as they go. A paper the author originally knew about and read when it 
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was a working paper might have become a journal article by the time the author submits the final 
version to publication. The citation is then to a journal article, but the true source was the 
previous working paper.  
 The conclusion is that working papers are read, at least by researchers for whom they are 
relevant. This implies that the role of journals in disseminating new research has been eroded, 
and therefore that quick publication of research in journals is less important today than it was in 
the past. Thus, the optimal FRT increased because of two separate reasons: the benefit of a 
longer FRT is higher today because it is more important to deter frivolous submissions (due to a 
higher cost of refereeing a paper); and the cost of a longer FRT is lower nowadays because the 
importance of quick publication (from social perspective) has been reduced. The increase in the 
FRT in practice is therefore in the same direction as the change in the optimal FRT. 
3.3 A Formal Model of the Changes in the Optimal FRT 
 To see more formally why an increased cost of handling manuscripts and the availability 
of working papers raise the optimal FRT, I introduce below a simple model of how the optimal 
FRT is determined. Denote the FRT by d (for “delay”), where d ≥ 0, and the number of 
submissions by n(d). As was explained above, a longer FRT changes the optimal behavior of 
authors in a way that reduces the number of submissions, implying that n’ < 0. The total cost of 
the refereeing process is equal to a cost per submission, c, times the number of submissions, n(d). 
  Denote the social value of the benefits of peer-reviewed journals as V(d; s), where s ∈ [0, 
1] is a measure of the spillover of information prior to publication in a journal. s = 0 corresponds 
to the case where no one knows about research done by others before the research is published in 
a journal. s = 1 corresponds to the case in which everyone knows about all the research that takes 
place and journal publication does not add any new information, including information about the 
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quality of the article. s is determined exogenously by the technology and the environment: 
working paper series, e-mail, and Internet, for example, increase the spillover of information 
prior to publication and increase the value of s. For simplicity, I assume that the functions V and 
n are continuously differentiable. 
 An increase in the FRT delays the dissemination of research, both to the general public 
and to other scholars who want to use the new knowledge as a basis for additional research, and 
therefore reduces V(d; s); formally, Vd < 0. The marginal cost of an increase in the FRT is 
smaller when the spillover of information is higher: when publication adds only little 
information, it is less crucial how quickly publication occurs. In the extreme case of s = 1, for 
example, since publication in a journal adds nothing, the marginal cost of an increased FRT is 
zero. This implies that Vd is smaller in absolute value when s is higher; since Vd < 0, it follows 
that Vd is higher when s is higher, implying Vds > 0.  
 Welfare is equal to the benefits from peer-review journals minus the cost of the peer-
review process:  
W(d; s, c) = V(d; s) − cn(d). 
The optimal FRT is obtained by maximizing W(d; s, c) with respect to d. Based on the empirical 
analysis in Azar (2004b), I also assume that d* is strictly positive for all s ∈ [0, 1]. For 
simplicity, I also assume that for given values of s and c, there is a unique value of d that 
maximizes W, denoted by d*. The following assumption summarizes the assumptions made so 
far: 
Assumption 1:(i) n’(d) < 0 for all d. 
  (ii) Vd < 0 and Vds > 0. 
  (iii) W has a unique global maximizer, denoted by d*, which is strictly positive. 
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  (iv) V and n are continuously differentiable. 
 
The first result is that an increase in the spillover of information raises the optimal FRT: 
Proposition 1: d* is strictly increasing in s. 
Proof: Take any value of c, and any two values of s such that s1 > s0, and denote the 
corresponding optimal FRTs by d0* and d1*. We want to show that d1* > d0*.  
(i) First, let us prove that it cannot be that d1* < d0*. Consider any value of d which is smaller 
than d0* and denote it by D. By the definition of d0* as the optimal FRT for s0, it follows that 










d . From Vds > 0 it 























implying that any D cannot be optimal with s1 because d0* yields higher welfare. 
(ii) Second, we can show that d0* is no longer optimal with s1. Since d0* is the global maximizer 
with s0, it is also a local maximizer, from which it follows that Wd(d0*; s0, c) = Vd(d0*; s0) − 
cn’(d0*) = 0. Because Vds > 0 we have Vd(d0*; s1) > Vd(d0*; s0), and therefore Wd(d0*; s1, c) = 
Vd(d0*; s1) − cn’(d0*) > 0. This implies that values of d slightly above d0* achieve higher welfare 
than d0* does when s = s1. Together with the result in part (i), this implies that the optimal FRT 
for s1 must be higher than d0*, i.e. d1* > d0*. 
Q.E.D. 
 
The second result is that an increase in the cost of handling a manuscript raises the optimal FRT: 
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Proposition 2: d* is strictly increasing in c. 
Proof: Take any value of s, and any two values of c such that c1 > c0, and denote the 
corresponding optimal FRTs by d0* and d1*. We want to show that d1* > d0*.  
(i) First, let us prove that it cannot be that d1* < d0*. Consider any value of d which is smaller 
than d0* and denote it by D. Because D < d0* we know that n(D) > n(d0*). By the definition of d0* 
as the optimal FRT for c0, it follows that W(d0*; s, c0) = V(d0*; s) − c0n(d0*) > W(D; s, c0) = V(D; 
s) − c0n(D). Rearranging it is easy to see that V(D; s) − V(d0*; s) < c0[n(D) − n(d0*)] < c1[n(D) − 
n(d0*)], from which it follows that W(d0*; s, c1) = V(d0*; s) − c1n(d0*) > V(D; s) − c1n(D) = W(D; 
s, c1). That is, welfare when c = c1 is higher with d0* than with any FRT smaller than d0*. 
(ii) Second, we can show that d0* is no longer optimal with c1. Since d0* is the global maximizer 
with c0, it is also a local maximizer, from which it follows that Wd(d0*; s, c0) = Vd(d0*; s) − 
c0n’(d0*) = 0. Since n’ < 0, we get Wd(d0*; s, c1) = Vd(d0*; s) − c1n’(d0*) > Vd(d0*; s) − c0n’(d0*) = 
0, implying that values of d slightly above d0* achieve higher welfare than d0* does when c = c1. 
Together with the result in part (i), this implies that the optimal FRT for c1 must be higher than 
d0*, i.e. d1* > d0*. 
Q.E.D. 
 Propositions 1 and 2 show formally that the higher spillover of information prior to 
publication today and the higher cost of handling manuscripts have increased the optimal FRT. 
Thus, the change in the actual FRT over the last 40 years, which was discussed above, is in the 
same direction as the change in the optimal FRT.  
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4. Conclusion 
 The academic review process is an important research topic since understanding it better 
and knowing more about it can help us improve the process and increase the productivity of 
economists and other scholars. Yet, this topic has received relatively little attention in the 
literature. One of the most criticized aspects of the review process is the long time it takes. The 
FRT is a particularly important topic, because it may delay the paper several times (if the paper 
is rejected from several journals prior to being accepted in another journal).  
 An examination of the FRT today and in the past shows a significant slowdown – the 
FRT increased from 1-2 months forty years ago to 3-6 months today. The optimal FRT, however, 
is not zero, and it increased over the years due to the increasing costs of refereeing a paper and 
the decreasing importance of quick publication in a journal (from a social perspective). The 
observation that the actual and optimal FRT both increased is intriguing; whether the increased 
optimal FRT is the reason for the actual increase in the FRT is an interesting question that is left 
for future research. It is possible that referees today, for example, feel less guilty when they 
delay the publication of an article, knowing that others who might be interested in it can read the 
working paper. Consequently, they handle papers less quickly than their past colleagues who felt 
more guilty when they delayed the publication process. Thus, indirectly, the same reasons that 
changed the optimal FRT could also change the behavior of referees and the actual FRT.   
 The insight that quick publication is less important today than in the past also has 
implications for the question how many revisions (and how significant) should articles go prior 
to publication. The benefit of more revisions is better articles; one of the costs is the delayed 
publication of new ideas. If quick publication becomes less important because the research is 
now available as working papers prior to publication, the optimal number of revisions increases. 
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Empirical evidence suggests that indeed the number of revisions and their extent required today 
are much higher than in the past in various economics journals (see Ellison, 2002a; 2002b). It is 
again possible that the behavior of referees and editors was affected by the reduced importance 
of quick publication and this caused the changes in the optimal and the actual number of 
revisions to be in the same direction; a more careful examination of this idea is left for future 
research.  
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Table I 






Period Source / journal 
issue 
Comments 
Economics Journals      
American Economic Review 132 154 7/01-6/02 May 2003. Rejected papers only. 
B.E. Journals in Economic 
Analysis and Policy 
51 NA  Website.  
B.E. Journals in 
Macroeconomics 
66 NA  Website.  
B.E. Journals in Theoretical 
Economics 
61 NA  Website.  
Canadian Journal of 
Economics 
NA 109 12/02-11/03 Website.  
Econometrica 118 107 2002 January 2004. New submissions only. 
 77 95   Revisions only. 
 112 105   All papers. 
Economic Inquiry NA 149 2002 October 2003.  
Economic Journal 127 131 2001 Editor’s report 
2002 (on-line). 
All papers. 
 118 124   Rejected papers. 
 214 174   Letters inviting revision. 
European Economic Review 101 131 2001 on-line.  
Journal of Economic History 85 86 7/01-6/02 March 2003. Including re-submissions. 
 91 91   Excluding re-submissions. 
Journal of Political Economy NA 167 2000 Ellison (2002a).  
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
NA 82 1997 Ellison (2002a). Papers sent to referees. 
 NA 47   All papers. 
 NA 114   Accepted papers only. 
RAND Journal of Economics 162 172 7/01-6/02 Autumn 2003.  
Review of Economic Studies  129 9/01-8/02 Website. New submissions only. 
  158   First revision. 
  88   Second revision. 
  48   Third revision. 
Southern Economic Journal 76 90 2002 October 2003. New submissions only.  
Accounting Journals      
The Accounting Review 57 58 6/2002-
5/2003 
October 2003. Including re-submissions. 
Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 
46 50 6/02-5/03 August 2003.  
Finance Journals      





The Journal of Finance 40 44 3/1/00-
5/31/03 




Comments: In those journals in which I calculated the mean FRT based on a distribution provided by the journal, the 
mean FRT is probably a little higher than the figure in the table because I had to exclude papers that were still in the 
review process from the computation (since they do not have an FRT yet), and these papers have a higher FRT on 
average. In addition, I treated all papers in the highest category (e.g. 10+ months) as having an FRT of the lower 
bound of that category (10 months in this example; since the journals do not report the upper bound of the highest 
category, I had to make an arbitrary assumption such as this). This also leads to some under-estimation of the mean 
FRT. The median FRT might also be slightly underestimated because of the first issue, but is not affected by the 
second. The percentage of papers in the highest FRT category and those that were still in process was such that the 
bias is small. The only case in which the bias would have been large is that of the Journal of Monetary Economics in 
which out of 261 papers, 144 are “Papers in process” and 52 are “Over 16 weeks” (data about papers received 
during 10/01-9/02); to avoid presenting a misleading number I drop the FRT for this journal from the table. 
Additional details about the computations performed (in those cases that the journals publish the distribution rather 
than the mean or median) can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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Table II 
First Response Times (FRT) in the QJE (in days) 
 Accepted papers Rejected papers 












1940 29 79 46 14 40 35 
1950 16 65 64 24 81 73 
1960 28 69 67 32 67 41 
1970 27 140 137 28 99 68 




Distribution of Current and Past Citations in the Leading Journals 
 Working 
paper 









Econometrica 1-4/1960 10 99 78 16 2 16 221 
In Percentage 4.5% 44.8% 35.3% 7.2% 0.9% 7.2% 99.9%a 
AER 3-6/1960 2 77 68 11 1 40 199 
In Percentage 1.0% 38.7% 34.2% 5.5% 0.5% 20.1% 100% 
Econometrica 5/2002 64 248 60 24 3 13 412 
In percentage 15.5% 60.2% 14.6% 5.8% 0.7% 3.2% 100% 
AER 3/2002 91 397 78 55 4 72 697 
In percentage 13.1% 57.0% 11.2% 7.9% 0.6% 10.3% 100.1%a 
 
a The sum is greater than 100% because of rounding of the various percentages. 
